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ABSTRACT:Real estate financing techniques for income-producing
properties underwent substantial changes during 1966-1970. Many
large institutional investors shifted from their traditional role as first-
mortgage lenders on a fixed interest rate basis to insistence, in addition,
on participating in the income of the property being financed,taking
either a percent of the income stream from the property (in addition to
the fixedinterest rate)or an ownership positionin the property
itself. ¶ In this study I examine the time pattern of income participa-
tion use, the events and conditions surrounding the development of
participation mortgages, the factors determining the choice between a
fixed interest and a participation financing, the trade-off between rate
and participation, the reasonableness of lender expectations, and lend-
ers' and developers' attitudes toward participations in 1975. Thestudy
is based on more than sixty interviews with mortgage officersof life
insurance companies, real estate investment trusts, and savingsbanks,
as well as with mortgage bankers, real estatedevelopers, and govern-
ment and trade associationofficials. ¶Inflation contributed to
the sharp increaseintheuseof income participations during
1968-1970 in two ways. First, concern over mounting inflation promp-
ted many institutional lenders to shift away from fixed interest rate
NOTE:I wish to thank Phillip Cagan, John fileri, and John Lintner; the members of thestaff reading
committee, Oliver H. Jones, Sherman J. Maisel, and Francis H. Schott; the members of dieDirectors'
reading committee, Philip M. Klutznick, lames J. O'Leary, and Arnold M. Soloway; and the staff members
o(the American Life Insurance Association for their thoughtftd reading of and constructive comments on
this paper. I am grateful to the American Life insurance Association for its financial suIort of this study.
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investments and toward participations in income 'treanis in the hope
that the latter would be increased by intlation. Second, inflation
through itsiriipact on the general level ot interest rates, resulted in
disintermediation in the traditional mortgage lending institutions.B
174, conditions had changed significantly, and with the changecanie
a sharp decrease in the use of participations. The bargaining power ot
lenders was less than in1 969- 1970 Perhaps more important, lenders
were less enthusiastic about participations and less willing to make the
necessary interest rate concessions to secure them,
In this study,I examine sonie of the forces that contributed to the sharp
increaseand equally rapid declinein theuse of income and equity
participations by large institutional investors during 1966-1974.As indi-
cated in the tabulation below, thestudy is based on more than sixty
interviews with individuals and institutions involved inmortgage ending:
The focus of the study ison the investing activities of life insurance
companies, as they were the largest andmost important institutional force
in the market. As one largemortgage banker observed in an interview:
The life insurance companieswere the leaders in the use of income participa-
tions. The savings banks were late in doingincome participations, but thencame
in with participations structuredon the same basis as those of the life insurance
companies And the commercial banks andbank-administered pension funds
were not important factors in commercialmortgage lending during 1969-1970,
A solid understanding of lifeinsurance company participationscould only
be gained, however, by alsostudying the investmentactivities of other
traditional mortgage lenders.For this reason, interviewswere conducted with a broad cross sectionof institutional lenders. Detailedpersonal
interviews were required becauseof the complexity of theissues involved.








Life insurance companies 12 29
Mortgage bankers 3 3
Mutual savings banks 4 5
Real estate developers 7 8
Real estate investment trusts 4 4
Regulatory authorities, associations, other 11 H
44 63
522 Thomas R.l'ipepe attitudes as business conditions changed and lenders gained experience
with mortgages based on participations. )n,
111 The information gathered in these intervtews was supplemented by a
By careful study of current literature in the field, internal policy papers of
File some lenders.and reports on individual mortgage loans, as well as by
of computer simulations of the performance of variously structured income
Is
the participations under different economic conditions.Iwas also able to
compare and check my own results with those of a study based on
extensive fieldinterviews conducted in 1970 by Mundy (1971). His
interview results, generated early in the history of income partidpations,
arp provided a very useful check on the statements I obtained from the people I
ity interviewed some two to four years later.
di-
xty
of TYPES OF PARTICIPATION AGREEMENT1
WS The structure of participations ran the gamut from a very simple percent
participation in the gross income of a project to some very complex
arrangements involving ownership of equity in certain projects by the
lending institutions themselves. In all participation agreements, the lender
participatedin either the income, ownership, or capita! gains of the
properties financed. The form of participation used depended basically on
the bargaining position of the lender and the borrower. Otherinfluential
factors included the type of property to be financed, the size of the
mortgage commitment, the equity needs andfinancial strength of the
borrower, the urgency of the project to the developer, the length ofthe
nce relationship between the two parties, the availability of mortgage money,
rce and more basic considerations such as state usury laws and tax statLis.
w:
The following discussion focuses on participations in whichthe lender
received as contingent interest a set percentage of the income flowof the
pa- project. Contingent interest participations accounted for 61 percentof all
me nonfarm mortgage and real estate commitments with variable income or
nce equity features made by life insurance companies duringJanuary 1968-
ncs June 1969 (see Table 1).2
n ly
er Percent of Gross lncme
ted In percent-of-gross participations, a set portion of the gross receiptsof the
nal income-producing property was paid to the lender,in addition to the
ed. contract rate of interest. The share was normally 2 to4 percent.
ce While percent of gross appealed to lenders because of itsanalytical and
eir administrative simplicity, it was very troublesome to borrowersfor three

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.reasons.First, a percent-of-gross participation sometimesresulted in a
ower maximum allowable first-mortgage loan than would havebeen the
case in a straight interest mortgage, the actual difference dependingon the
internal appraisal practices of the lendinginstitution.Some institutions
required that the cash flow streamto be capitalized be calculated after
deduction of the outflow associatedwith the payment of the participation
This was only true ofpercent-of-gross participations and reflected thehigh
degree of certainty of theirpayment. Clearly, a decrease in the streamto be
capitalized resulted ina lower capitalized value, all other things being
equal, and the impacton a thinly capitalized developer would he substan-
tial. For example, consideran apartment complex with an expectedcash flow of $719,000per year after deduction of all cash operatingcosts but
before deducting financingcosts. The developer is faced witha choice
between a thirty-yearmortgage at a straight interest rate of 9½percent or at a fixed rate of 9 percent plusa 4 percent participation in thegross income of the property. Grossincome isestimated at $1,041,000 andcash operating costsat $322,000. With the straightinterest mortgage, the capitalized value of theproperty would be $7,072,OOo; withthe participa-
tion, the capitalized valuewould be only $6,658,000,since the cash flow
is reduced to $677,000when the cost of theparticipation is deducted. The
difference in the equityinvestment required of the developeris substantial: $31 1,000, assuminga first-mortgage loan of 75percent of the appraised value.
There were two factorsthat could offsetsome of the adverse impact of
participations of the kind described,namely, the tendency ofincome participation loans to be slightlylonger in term and thepossibility of setting the capitalizationrate on the basis of the interestrate on the specific financing for thatproperty. For example,it was not unusual for the
developer to be confrontedwith a choice betweena thirty-year straight mortgage at 91/2 percent anda thirty-two-year mortgageat 9 percent plus a 4 percent participationin gross revenue. Asdiscussed later in thisreport, some companies wouldset the capitalization rateon the basis of the thirty-two-yearmortgage at 9 percent, if thatfinancing alternativewere available. This greatlyreduces the adverse impactof the participatio,ion the maximum allowableloan and, therefore,the required equityinvest- ment by the developer. Inthe case above, forexample, if themortgage term is thirty-twoyears, rather than thirty, thecapitalized value with the participation is $7,049,000:the cash flow is$677,000 as before, butthe capitalization rate is0.096096. The differencein capitalization valuesis then only $23,000,and the equity difference,assuming a first-niortgage loan of 75percent of the appraisedvalue, is $17,000. A secondreason for the aversionof developersto percent-ofgross participation was the financialburden it placedon a property. Typically,
526 Thomas R. Piperthe lender rcquircd that contingent interest be paid out of any cash flow
c generated by the project, regardless of whether there was sufficient cash
flow to meet all cash outlays. The total annual debt burden for a mortgage
S containing a percent-of-gross participation usua!Iy exceeded the annual
debt burden for a straight interest mortgage even after adjustment for the
slightly longer term and lower interest rate the former might have. For
example, assume that the apartment complex described above is financed
e with a $5.25 million mortgage. The total debt burden in the first year
would be $533,823 for a thirty-year straight interest mortgage. It would be
$546,144 (including the expected outflow for the income participation) for
a thirty-two-year mortgagewith a 9 percent interest rate and a 4 percent
participation in the gross income. The difference of $12,321 in the out-
e flows represents a 1.2 percent difference in tolerable vacancy rates and
therefore is significant to the developer.
e Finally, developers were concerned that percent-of-gross participations
h could damage the financial health of projects if the rate of inflation was
high. At a time when inc:reases in rents might be necessary to offset sharply
rising costs, part of the rent increase would he diverted because of the
participation. This represented a further risk to developers (although the
risk imposed by the participation was clearly less than the risk that rent
controls would prevent rent increases). Developers were also troubled by
d the possibility of a lender earning a very high return on a property that was
in difficulty. Thus, while 9 of 18 respondents specifically askedfelt that
percent of gross was the lenders' favored form of income participation,
e rather than percent of the increase in gross (7 respondents) or ofdefined
g net income (2), none of theni thought the first form wasfavored by
c borrowers. Instead, 9 each thought borrowers favored one of the other two
e forms.
Percent of Net Income
Participations may be in the form of a payment to thelender of a set
percent of the net income of the project. Ina typical arrangementthe
lender might require 20 to 40 percent of the net income ascontingent
interest. Percent of net income was often moreacceptable to the developer
than other participation forms because it reduced thefixed debt burden
and let the balance vary with the capacity of the project to payit. As one
insurance company officer phrased it, "If you're sharingthe net, a devel-
oper isn't paying it unless he's earning it."6 Furthermore,percent-of-net
participations had no adverse impact on the valuationof the property for
lending purposes. Since the expected outlay for participation wasboth
highly uncertain and a residual claim on the flows, appraisersdid not
deduct it from the stream to be capitalized. In fact, on apercent-of-net
Income Participations on Mortgage Loans 527mortgage, the capitalized value of aproperty could be increased if the
capitalization rate was basedon the terms of financing for the specific
property and if concessions were madeon either the term of the mortgage
or the fixed interest rate.
However, percent of net presentedmajor problems to lenders. First, it
was very time consuming and expensive to administerand collect. A
borrower could inflate certainexpenses on the income statement and
decrease the net profit figure, whichwas the basis for the participation.
Several techniqueswere used by lenders to guard against ballooningof
expenses by developers. One approachwas to define the participationas "a percent of 'definable'net income," whereby expenseswere usually
limited to taxes and insuranceas paid, plus a fixed percent of thegross income as an allowance foroperating charges. Alternatively, thelender might itemize certainexpenses such as management fees,painting and
repairs, and others, and insistthat those expenses couldnot exceed an agreed amount. Finally,some lenders who did not definenet income
rigorously insisted on auditing themajor bilk of the borrowerto ensure that
expenses were reasonable. All thesetechniques involved additional ad-
ministrative costs, however.
Second, the skills andorientation necessary to analyzeand monitor returns from net-incomeparticipations were different fromthose of most
mortgage lenders. Percent ofgross, by contrast, was easierto calculate and to monitor and less subjectto dispute.
Percent of Cross Incomeover Some Base RevenueLevel
In a participation ingross income over a fixed baserevenue level, a project was required to achievea specified level of operatingperformance before the developer paida share of the gross incomeas additional interest. For example, a lender mightmake a mortgage loanon a project and ask for 20 percent of the rental incomeabove 95percent of the building's "sched- uled" income. Thelatter might be definedas, say, the revenue realized with 100percent occupancy at originalrental rates.
Income participationsof the kind justdescribed did not lowerthe appraised value of theproperty or the maximumfirst-mortgage loan, since no deduction was made forthe expected valueof the participation.In fact, the valuation mightbe higher than witha straight interest loan ifinclusion of the participationresulted in an interestrate Concessionor a lengthening of the term of themortgage and thecapitalization rate usedto value the property was basedon the actual interestrate of the specificproject. In periods of highinflation, however,the favorableimpact on valuation was offset by other risksto the developer. Insuch periods, rentalincreases often wereneeded to offsetincreases in cashoperating expenses, If the
528
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developer wererequired to give up a relatively large share of the increased
rental income asadditional interest, the financial health of the property
would be threatened.Consequently, this form of participation was often
arranged to apply only to renta increases exceeding increases in taxes and
certain otherenumerated expenses. In this form, it represented an accept-
able compromise forlenders and borrowersFor the developer,it had
either a neutral or abeneficial impact on the maximum allowable first-
mortgage loan and itconverted part of the debt burden into a form that
varied with the capacity of the project to pay it. For the lender, it provided
an opportunity toparticipate in the success of the project.It should be
recognized, however, that inclusion of the cost offset provision made the
value of the participation very uncertain and more expensive to administer
and collect. On the negative side, the concession onthe fixed interest rate
in return for theparticipation hurt the net new-money rate, which was
important in the competition bylife insurance companies for pension
business.
INSTITUTIONAL USE OF INCOME PARTICIPATIONS
Among the major types of financial institution,life insurance companies
were by far the most activeand, because of their size, the most important
users of income and equity participations.While only 3 percent of their
new commitments in 1964 onincome-producing properties involved par-
ticipations, the proportion reached 62 percent inthe first half of 1969 and
an estimated 70 to 75 percentduring the first half of 1970 (Table 2). Their
use of participations then subsided asquickly as it had arisen, accounting
for an estimated 5 to 10 percent of new commitments in1973 and 1974.8
The pattern for mutual savings banks was similar in timing,although less
dramatic in intensity and dollar volume, and reflectedprimarily the lending
activities of a few large New York banks.9 Theseinstitutions adopted
mortgage lending policies that closely paralleledthose of large life insur-
ance companies, with heavy emphasis onloans to income-producing
properties and a strong interest in income participations.For the savings
bank industry as a whole, outstanding mortgage commitmentsthatin-
cluded an income or equity participation totaled $451million as of
September 30, 1970or roughly 10 percent of theindustry's total out-
standing commitments. Of that $451 million, $443million represented
income participation loans, and $8 million,equity participations. The
comparable figures for income and equity participationloans held were
$256 million, $234 million, and $22 million (NAMSD1971, p.1).
While the total of $451 million is large in an absolute sense,it is dwarfedS





Total Mortgage Income or All 1-4and Real Estate YearEquity FeaturesOther Total FamilyCommitments
SOURCEkAt9?O, p.4). The lilly-sixcompanies from which datawere received accoijntl For 80 percent ofthe total assets of all lifeinsurance companiesin the United States atyear-end 1968 ajantiary_June On)y.
by the estimatedtotals for the lifeinsurance industry Asof September 30, 1 970, totaloutstanding commitmentsof reporting lifeinsurancecompanies on mortgage loansto nonfarmincomeproducingproperties amountedto $8 billion (UAA,n.dj. Sincereporting companiesaccounted for only 78 percent of theassets of all U.S. lifeinsurancecompanies, a reasonable estimate of totaloutstandingcommitments on thoseproperties might be $10 billion ofwhich anestimated $5 billionto $6 billionrepresented outstandingcommitments that includedsome form of incomeparticipa- [ion,10
Real estateinves[me,it trusts(REIT5) were alsovery activeusers of income participationsA survey of theportfolios ofseven long-term mortgage REIT5 showedthat 98 of the108 mortgages theyheld at year-end 1 970 included







































96 100 1966 7 93 100 1967 10 90 100 1968 28 72 too
1969 62 38 100TABLE 3Life Insurance Purchases in U.S. Life Insurance
Companies, 1950-1974
(millions of dollars)
SOURCE:Spectator Year Book (Institute oflife Insurance and Life Insurance Agency
Management Association. Servicemen's group life insurance is excluded.
THE UNDERLYING ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL
CONDITIONS
In the period 1969-1970 there was a convergence of tight monetary
conditions, a strong real estate market, a shift toward aggressive perfor-
mance investing, and an increasing concern among lenders over inflation.
Each by itself was probably not strong enough to power any dramatic shift
in real estate financing patterns. In combination, however, they provided
the necessary impetus.
Pressures on Life Insurance Companies for
Investment Performance
The life insurance industry was fairly successful in its marketing of protec-
tion during the post-World War II period. The share of disposable personal
income spent on premium and annuity payments held relatively steady at
3.8 percent,12 as sales of life insurance increased steadily (Table 3).
Many executives in the life insurance industry were not satisfied, how-
ever. While sales of protection had reached ever higher levels, the industry
held a declining share of the savings market. At year-end 1 968 private life
insurance and insured pension reserves accounted for only 7.7 percent of
total financial assets held by individuals in the United States. This rep-
resented a substantial decline from the 11 .7 percent share in 1950.
Of particular concern was the rapid growth of private noninsured
pension reserves and of investment company shares. In 1950 these two
forms of investment by households totaled $10 billionor less than 20
percent of the $55 billion held as private life insurance reservesand
insured pension reserves. By 1968 investment company shares and private
noninsured pension reserves had reached $154 billionalmost 104 per-
cent of the total size of private life insurance reserves and insured pension
reserves (Table 4).
1950 $ 18,260 $ 6,237 $5,492 $ 29,989
1960 56,183 1 5,328 6,906 78,417
1970 138,356 5 2, 139 6,612 197,107
1972 156,859 59,953 7,394 224,206
1974 199,239 85.865 6,657 291,761













































































































































































































































































































































































































































The explanation for the declining share of the savings market seemed
clear. Bothindividuals and corporate pension fund managers wereaware
that the averageannual return from common stocks since World War II
was 13 to 14percent)3 They expected, therefore, that the return from a
welkTianaged portfolio of such stock would exceed that from the savings
component of cash value life insurance or insured pension reserves14
puder (1970, p. 50) observed that:
Many of those people who desire the protection offered by a life insurance
policy, but who are leery of the value of returns they might receive in (lie future,
are shunning the ordinarycash value life policies and buying term insurance. In
recent years. the American public's attitude toward insurance has gradually
shifted in favor of term (payable only in the event of death) rather than cash value
insurance (requiring higher premiums and payable 1)0th in the event of death and
at stated surrender values).
Increasing numbers of Americans bought term insurance and invested the
difference in premium amounts between term and cash value in common
stocks. For the insurance industry, the trend toward term insurance meant
the generation of fewer reserves or investible funds per premium dollar
paid (Schott 1969, p. 3).
The response of the life insurance industry to these pressures involved
both the development of new products and the adoption of more aggres-
sive investment policies. A number of life insurance companies created
and mass-merchandised their own mutual fund shares in an attempt to give
their agents a means of countering the arguments and concerns of a
customer cool on life insurance and entranced by the stock market (Rose
1968). Variable annuities were offered in response to fears about inflation,
and legislation enacted in several states in 1962 authorized life insurance
companies to set up separate equity accounts for the funding of pension
plans.
In addition to new products, the industry also sought out new ways to
increase investment returns. It would be inaccurate to view the shift toward
income and equity participations and common stocks in 1966-1970 as an
isolated attempt to invest funds more profitably. It should be considered as
part of a series of moves by the industry to improve yields and, thereby, its
competitive positiori.moves that included the following for manylife
insurance companies:
1.A shift away from U.S. government securities.Holdings of these
had been increased during the Great Depression and World War Il.The
industry was a net seller of U.S. Treasury securities in twenty-five outof
the twenty-eight years 1947-1974, with the bulk of its salescompleted
by the mid-i 950s. While total industry holdings of financial assets more
than quadrupledfrom $47 billion in 1947 to $255 billionin 1974-
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holdings of U.S. governmentsecurities declined from $22 billionto less than $4 billion.
A move early in the l950s towardlower-quality, less liquid,but
higher-yielding private placements(Shapiro and Wolf 1973).
An increased emphasison commercial mortgages duringthe 1960s, with a correspondingcutback in one-to-four_familymortgages, in which yields were relativelylow. In every year from 1947to 1960 more
life insurance investibletunds went into suchmortgages than into
commercial mortgages. Beginningin 1961, this relationshiphas been reversed. In fact, holdings ofone-to-foUr_family mortgages bythe life insurance industry have fallenfrom $26 billion in 1961to $18 billion in 1974. In sharp contrast, theindustry's holdings ofcommercial mortgages have risen from $19billion to $59 billion.
A shift out of low-interestbonds and into high-interestbonds in the 1960s to theextent that the capital positionsof the companies could
absorb the realized losses.
Attempts during the secondhalf of the l960sto capitalize on management forecasts of interestrates by varying forwardcommitment positions (See Lintner,Piper, Fortune 1975),
Institutional Interest inEquities
Inclusion of incomeparticipations was alsoconsistent with a general shift by institutionalinvestors towardaggressive equity investing.Institutional interest in commonstocks had beenstrong throughout the l960s.From 1955 to 1969, thepercent of total assets investeijin corporate stocks bythe major types of financialinstitutions was either stableor had increased (see Table 5). The trendwas spurred by theperformance of stocks afterWorld War IIand the adoptionby investors of theconcept of totalreturn (dividend income pluscapital appreciation).The quickeningpace of inflation was also widelyused in 1965-1968as a major justification for
increased investmentof institutional fundsin common stocks.It was argued that stockinvestments should beincreased still furtherprecisely because inflationarypressures were inexorably buildingand the added inflation wouldenhance equity values(Lintner 1973)."'


























TABLE 5Percent of Total Assets ofFinancial Institutions









istered by banks and trust
compafliesa
1955196019651969
SOURCE:Board of Governors of the Federal ReserveSystem (1973), Goldsmith, ed. (1973).
'Common stocks only.
in
ci companies (as well as manybank pension departments)negotiated conver-
n sion privilegesand warrants on manyprivately placed debt linancings (see
nt Piper and Arnold 1976).To be in straight interestbonds was seen by many
as evidenceof art archaic andinadequate investmentphilosophy. The
general investing climateencouraged institutional investors totrade off a
little on the fixed rate orquality for an equity feature(Belliveau 1969))s
The profitability ofReal Estate
Institutional investors did notconfine their quest for above-averagereturns
to just commonstocks and equity features ondebt issues. Life insurance
companies had longinvested 3 to 4 percent oftheir funds in real estate.For
example,in the late 1940s,they had entered thefield of leaseback
financing as a method ofproviding 100 percentfinancing to developers
and industrial tenants. However,the life insurancecompanies frequently
forfeitedallinflation protection andcapital appreciationpotential by
granting the lessees optionsfor long-termreduced tent renewal or repur-
chase that bore no relationshipto the value ofthe property at thetime the
option would be exercised.Very few life insurancecompanies seemed
influenced during this period bythe possibilities ofinflation; their primary
concern was to findenough investmentopportunities (RickS i964).'
Attitudes of life insurancelenders began to changeearly in the 1960s.
They became less liberal ingranting renewaland repurchaseoptions and
insisted that if they were to take100 percent ofthe real estaterisk they
ought to receive most of thebenefit of anyappreciation in capital orrental
value. Additionally, repurchaseoptions weregranted on the basisof
market-like values (Rose Jr. 1968, p.47). In partthis insistencestemmed
from research findings that equityinvesting in real estatehad been highly
33% 43% 55% 59%
1 2 5 11
4 5 5 7
33 34 39 35
87 87 87 86
49 52 44 48
57 65 68 68S
In almost all cases the'3 percent of gross" participationmeets the criterion of
achieving at least 50 basispoints in the firstfull year of operations.. In addition, the "percentageof the gross" income kickershows a tendency to meet
profitable in the past. David (1963) reported average annual returns of
21-29 percent for four different samples of real estate.2° Thesereports
seemingly confirmed what mortgage lenders had suspected, namely, that
they had borne most of the risk by providing 100 percent financing andthe
developers had made all themoney.
Equity investing also was a seemingly easy way for lendersto extend
their traditional patterns of loan-making. They had establishedmortgage
departments skilledin appraising income-producing properties and in
monitoring the construction phase of development. Therewas seemingly
little differetice between the techniquesnecessary for successful mortgage
lending and those required for either joint venturingor income sharing on
mortgage loans. And the timing seemed excellent. The need forspace of all
types seemed strong, as evidenced by the lowvacancy rates in 1968 and
1969: In 1968, vacancies plus bad debtsas proportions of gross total
income ranged between 3.4 and 4.1percent for unfurnished residential
housing of various kinds and between5.1 and 7.3 percent for furnished
ones; for 1969, the figures were 2.8 to 4.0percent for unfurnished
categories and 4.1 to 6.4 percent for furnishedones. By contrast, the range
for unfurruished rates in 1 962was 4.3-5.9 percent; for furnished, 7.7-9.6.
For a national sample of office buildings,the occupancy rate had firmedto
97.1 percent by 1969, after declining from98.9 percent in 1946 and to
95.2 percent in 1964.2
Real Estate Returns and Inflation
The interest in real estateinvestments was heightened by the sharp decline
in the stock market throughout1969 which transformed theconventional
wisdom from a belief that inflationwas good for common stocks to a strong
conviction that stock prices wouldsuffer under continued inflationary
conditions.22 Stocks appearedto have failed as a hedge againstinflation,
and participations in realestate seemed to offer the last remaininghope.
This hope had a seeminglysolid historical basis. Rents forall types of
properties had been increasing stronglysince the end of World War II, and,
as shown by Mundy (1971), incomeparticipations seemed to offer the
prospect of substantial returns. Mundystudied the actual operatingresults of seventeen newincome-producing properties duringthe second half of the l960s and concluded thatlife insurance companiescould have in- creased their rates ofreturn to levels significantly higherthan those on
fixed return mortgage loansby entering intoparticipation mortgages. He summarizes:
536 Thomas R. PiperornePartictPatb0On Mortgage Loans
mc-
the secondcriterionv. hichjthe achie en)ent it(1t('I Pt) h.i'.i'. point'. in tb
thud to filthyears
01 the 17total projectsi 0 meet thejeId Cr!terR)I) 0./t to(t hi'.'. 1)0110'. in
the third tofifthearsif the partCipatiOfl isstructured.0 )('1('1)1 1)1 ilsm'.'.
income inexcess of 95percent ot schculed rCiltS)
Several additionalfactors contributed toinstitutional interest in participa-
tions. First,the lenders werereceiving very high interest rates--atleast on
anhistorical basisevenafter some small concession toget the participa-
tion. "Doingkickers was made alittle bit easier by the fact thatthe rate
was still veryattractive on anhistorical basis.' Second. some loanofficers
and loancommittees seemedexcited about the possibilityof income
participationsand insisted on themalmost blindly. (The following quota-
dons and alllater ones notattributed to a specific source arebased on
interviewsconducted for this study.
"A number oflenders didn't think outwhy they wanted an income
partiCipatioll.It was a fad thatthey just wanted to follow."
"There was pressurefrom top management todo kickers since others
were doingthem and there was abelief that life insuranceconipanies
have made millionairesout of a numberof developers byproviding 100
percent financing."
"We were under pressureto match theperformance of thesecurities
department which wasnegotiating equitykickers into many debtprivate
placements by includingincome participations onour mortgageloans."
Third, some lenders feltcompelled to followcompetitors into extensive use
of income participationsout of fear that theywould otherwise suffer severe
competitive disadvantageshould participations provevaluable. Finally,
income participationsrepresented an opportunityto institutiOfl5 toexpand
their "equity" investmentsin real estatewithout violating stringentstatti-
tory restrictions on themaximum percentof assets that couldbe invested in
real estate.
Tight Money Conditions
The ability of real estate lendersto insist on incomeand ecluity 1artiCipa
tions in 1969-970 alsoreflected a majorshift in bargainingpower.24
During the preceding fifteen yearslife insurancecompanies hadbeen
concerned that there would nothe enough attractiveinvestment oppor-
tunities. There is some evidencethat bothloantovabue ratiosand loan
maturities on income propertymortgage loanswereincreased hetwee°
537TABLE 6Net Acquisition ofFinancial Assets by Selected
Financial Institutions,1%1-1973
(millions of dollars)
SOURCE:Board of Governors ofthe Federal ReserveSystem (1973). aAnnualaverages.
blnclude$4 billion in advancesfrom the Federal HomeLoan Bank C Lifeinsurance company figuresare net of policy loans.
1954 and 1965as lenders competed for
attractive investments (Shipp 1969)25
The situation hadchanged dramaticallyby 1969,as a tight monetary policy and strongdemand for fundsresulted in highinterest rates and disintermedjation Hardesthit were thetraditional mortgagelenders-the savings banks, savingsand loanassociations conimercialbanks, and life insurance companies(Table 6).
The pressureon the savings banks,savings and loanassociations, and life insurancecompanies was in facteven more severe thansuggested by the data in Table6. Many financialinstitutions anticipatedhigher levels of investible funds for1969 and based theirforwardcommitments in 1967 and 1968on those anticipationsThe unexpectedand sharp declinein their investiblefunds resulted inexcessively highcommitment positions in 1969 andprompted those lendersto substantiallyreduce theirnew corn- mjtrne,)t levels untilthe end of June1970. The data inTable 7 show the magnitude of the reductionin newcommitments by reportinglife insur- ance companies
Furthermore the financingneeds of allsectors of theeconomy were very strong, partly becauseinflationarypressures had raised thecost of plant, buildings, andequipment andencouraged someacceleration of building plans. Realestate developerswere reluctant to shelveprojects, as Construc- tion costswere rising atan annual rate of10 percent,development Opportunities seemedattractive, and theywere eager to keeptheir devel- opment teams together.At the sametime, apermanent takeoutcommit-
Mutual
J965 1966 1967 1968 1969
savings banks
Savings and loan




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.540 Thomas R. Piper
ment was still a precondition to securing construction financing.Devel-
opers had very few alternatives in 1969-1970 to securingcommitments for
permanent financing from the traditionalsources and, while they were
unhappy with income participations, theirconcern was overridden by their
need to line up financing. Lendersobserved:
"We could be very hard-nosed about insistenceon an income participa-
tion. Developers were undergreat pressure to keep their teams together.
Demand for space was strong in1969-1970 and they were unwillingto
risk missing a major projectopportunity."
"A developer might negotiate witha life conipany for up to a year before
the comnhitmentwas made. He couldn't afford to quibble aboutrate at
the last moment when the ideaof a kicker was raised. Ata minimum,
this could result in a significant delayduring which time buildingcosts
could rise substantially. Atworst, it could result in an inability toever do
the deal. The developer simplydoesn't have much flexibilityat this point
if money istight."
The bargainingseesaw became heavily weighted in favorof the lender
and, according to one realestate officer at a major life insurancecompany,
"in today's market119701 we can make just aboutany deal we care to."
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FIXEDINTEREST AND
PARTICIPATION MORTGAGES
By 1969 the greatmajority of large life insurancecompanies and real estate
investment trusts that investedin long-termmortgages were writing at least
some of their loans with incomeparticipations. However, lendersvaried greatly in theiruse of participations (Table8).Inpart,this reflected
differences among lenders intheir interest in incomeparticipations. A few lenders were slow inrecognizing their strengthened bargainingposition; others doubted the valueof participations andwere willing to offer
developers a choice betweena participation loan orone based on a higher fixed interest rate(most developers chose thelatter). However, thefield interviews indicated that therewere also systematic differencesbetween participation and straight interestloans in terms of thekind of developer and project involvedin each, independent oflender attitudes.
Straight interest loanstended to he ofsomewhat higher quality than those with an incomeparticipation. Ten of eighteenrespondents indicated that a small butsignificant quality differenceexisted, especially during the first ten months of 1 969.27 Strong developerswere able to avoid a partici-TABLE 8
DistribUtiofl of 56Life Insurance Companies by Percentage




pation by virtue oftheir proven abilities,attractiveness to lenders,and
access to alternativefinancing sources. In fact,several lenders whoinsisted
on incomeparticipations reported aloss of some strongdevelopers as a
result.
it would be incorrect toconclude, however, thatthe overall qualityof
first-mortgage lending bylife insurance companiesand savings banks
deteriorated during the period.While there werequality differences be-
tween the two sortsof loan, their overallquality may verywell have
increased. This view is borne outby statements ofrespondents on this
question directly and by examinationof their methodsof rationing credit.
"Income participations were notusually a way to makeloans that were
unacceptable on a fixed interestrate basis."
"Loans with income participationsinvolved somewhatweaker devel-
opers than those financed on astraight couponifixed interestibasis
However, we always loaned tothese developersbut used torecognize
their slightly lower quality byasking for a highercoupon. In1969970
we decided to ask for akicker instead."
The interview evidence also indicatedthat one ofthe first actionsby
lenders as money tightened was to raisetheir qualitystandards and to
percent ofTotal New
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eliminate marginal loans.Interestingly, they alsocut back oierv-high. quality loansoftenbacked by creditleaseswhichwere acquired primar- ily when thesupply of investiblefunds exceeded thatof somewhat lower-quality, higher-yieldingloans (see Fortune1973). While a numberof those interviewedindicated that theyrefused mortgage dealson whichno worthwhile participationwas available, onlyone believed that hisinstflu- tion had sacrificedits normal qualitystandards. All remaininglenders first tightened lendingstandards and then(as the money supplyshrank further) eliminated deals inwhich a participationwould be of littlevalue. The tabulation belowshows thesequence of actions takenby the sampleof insurance companiesand mutualsavings banks inrationing credit.The figures show thenumber of respondentstaking the specifiedaction.
A number of fixedinterest loanswere made becausethe prospects for rent increaseswere poor or the loanwas so small that theadministrative costs of a participationwould exceedits value. Insome cases suchas properties on fixednet credit leases,there wasno chance of rentincreases; in others, suchas farm loans, therewas difficulty in tryingto structure the participation terms.
STRUCTURE OFINCOMEPARTICIPATION LOANS
The statedterms of a mortgagedeal reflect thesimultaneousnegotiation of eight considerations:the interestrate, the form andamount of income participation, thepayout term, theloan-to-value ratio,the valuationplaced on the property, the
prepayment provisionsand penalties,personal guaran- tees of themortgage or leaseby a financially
strong individual, and mortgage callprovisions thatcan be executed bythe lender atprespecified dates throughoutthe term of theloan. Thissection is limitedto a discussion of the differences
between fixedrate loans and
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Lenders stated that appraisalstandards were as rigorous for participation as
for fixed rate mortgagesand that the valuation placed on a property was
not a subject of negotiation.However, eight of the respondentsindicated
that the rate used tocapitalize the income stream from a property was
related to the fixed interest rate set onthe mortgage for that property. Thus,
a propertyfinanced by a fixed rate loan wouldbe appraised at a lower
value than if it were financed by aparticipation loan at a lowerfixed rate.
This was true, of course, only for aparticipation structured as a percentof
either defined net or the increase in grossincome. A percent-of-gross
participation reduces the income stream tobe capitalized and niayresult in
either a higher or a lower valuation,depending on the specifics of theloan
agreement.
Loan-to-Value Ratio
Only one lender stated that it hadstretched the loan-to-valueratio as a
means of securing incomeparticipations. The othersindicated that they
operated close to, but not beyond, the maximumpercent allowed bythe
state regulatory authorities on bothfixed rate and participationmortgages.
Payout Term
The interviews did indicate some stretchingof the payout termof the
mortgage in return for an income participation.This represented avaluable
concession to the developer, as it reducedthe annual debtservice that the
property had to support. The amountof stretching out wasnot great,
however, with one or two years the usual!ength (13 respondents);one
Income
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prepayment
Provisions and Penalties
As interestrates rose to newheights, lenders grew increasingly interested in
0cking borrowersinto loan agreements for long periods of time. The
concern oflenders was reflected in boththeir efforts to ensure takedown of
the permanentfinancing upon completion of the property (irrespective of
any declinein interest rates thatniight occur after negotiation of the
forward commitment)and the lengthening periods during which prepay-
ment of thepermanent financing wasprohibited. By 1969, the "closed"
period, duringwhich prepayment was prohibited, had reached 10-15
years (versuSroughly 5-7 years in the early 1 960s),and the prepayment
penalty in the first yearafter that period had reached 5-6 percent (versus
3-5 percent inthe early 1960s). The conditions werethe same for both























indicated a three- to four-year extension,and eight claimed therewas no
difference in treatment. An increaseof two years in the payoutterm (from
twenty years to twenty-two years)on a mortgage written at 8percent would reduce the annualpretax debt burden by 4 percent.
Fixed Interest Rate
Many of the lenders indicated theywere able to get the going interestrate and an income participationby making a concessionon the payout term.
However, it was usuallynecessary to accept a lower fixed interestrate than would have been availableon a mortgage of the same lengthenedterm written on a fixed rate basis.The concessionon rate in return fora participation averaged aboutone-quarter percent, with a maximumof three-fifths percenton a few loans by one lender. Thirteenof the respon dents stated that theconcession was usually one-eighthto one-quarter
percent, while another six stated thatit ranged betweenone-quarter and one-half percent.
ihe willingness of lendersto trade off more fixedrate for a larger income











decision towrite a mortgageat a fixed interest rate of percent plus a
participati0flinstead of 9 percentand no.participation, was based on the
expectation thatpartiupation would raisethe return to percent
over theholding period.This translates into an expectedadditional return
of O65basis pointsanamount consistent withMundy's findings based
oninterviews ini97O.Itshould be recognized, however, that the
majority ofthe lenderseither made no estimate of thevalue of the
participation on aspecific property or had littleconfidence in the estimate.
This lowerssomewhat the confidencein the stated payoff schedule.
lenders sawthe 2-to-I payoffschedule as a reasonable compensation
for theuncertain return on incomeparticipations. Clearly, therelationship
between thefixed rate forgone andthe expected value of the participation
should varysubstantiallY according tothe type of participations since,for
example, participationin gross income isconsiderably less risky than a
participation indefined net. What is lessclear is whether the trade-offs
were made, infact, on the basis ofexplicit analysis. It is known that some
lenders and smallerdevelopers frequently failed to carryout any careful
analysis and balancingof risk and return in settingthe payoff schedule.
EFFECTIVENESS OF INCOMEPARTICIPATIONS AS A
HEDGE ON INFLATION
The strong trend during967_97O toward inclusionof an income partici-
pation in mortgage loansraises several questions:
What level of return is likelyfrom each kind of incomeparticipa-
tion?
How responsive are the returnsfrom the variouskinds of partici-
pation to the rate of inflation,lags in rent increases,and differences in
the closed period of the mortgage?
What is the implication of usurylaws for theoptimal structure of
the participation?
How certain is the return fromthe various incomeparticipations?
A set of simulations was run both toestimate the valueof income
participations and to compare the effectivenessof various kindsof partici-
pations as hedges against inflation. Thesimulations werebased on data for
a large apartment complex in Houston,Texas, on which alife insurance
lender had provided a $5 1/4million first mortgageloan and forwhich
estimates of first-year rents and operatingcosts wereavailable.30 The



































thefavorable assumption thatconstant annual inflation was thesame for both
rents and operating costs.Lags arid differeittes in the ratesof inflation
were then introduced into the analysis. However, fora participation in
gross income over a fixed base level,no offset was made for increasesin cash operating costs.
Returns if Rents and Cash OperatingCosts
Inflate at the Same Rate
The income participationstranslate into a substantial increaseinthe internal rate of return from themortgage loan, even at the fairlymoderate inflation rate of 3percent per year (see Table 10, below).The additional
return from a participation of 2percent of gross rentals or 20percent of the
increase in gross rentals is44-50 basis points, assuming thatthe inflation rate is 3 percent and that the loanhas ten years togo to prepayment. This
is consistent with theexpressed belief of lenders thatthey acquireda participation worth approximately50 basis points by forgoing25 basis points of fixed interestrate.
Responsiveness of Various Kindsof Participation to Inflation
Percent-of-gross participationsare much less responsive to therate of inflation than thetwo other forms. As shownin Table 10, below, the additional return froma participation of 2percent of gross income is 40 basis points, assumingno inflation and a fifteen-yearperiod before repay- ment. The additionalreturn increases to 71 basispoints if the annual rateof inflation is 9percent. In contrast the additionalreturn from a participation of 20 percent of theincrease in gross incomeover first-year scheduled rents is zero if there isno inflation, but rises to 290 basispoints if rents rise 9 percent peryear, since the lender receives20 percent of the increasein that form ofparticipation The indication ofthe findings is that thechoice of incomeparticipation form should beinfluenced by the inflationrate forecast.
Importance of the ClosedPeriod for Various
Kinds of Participation
The length of theclosed period isvery important for allmortgages written in times of highinterest rates, butespecially for those thatinclude a participation in net incomeor in the increase ingross. The additional return rises from 50basis points to78 at an annualinflation rate of 3 percent if the mortgageremains in effect for fifteenyears rather than just ten. At an inflationrate of9 percentper year, the value of theadditional
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Thomas R. Piperlive 'ears is even moresubstantial: the additional yield rises from 173 basis
points to 290.
In contrast, theadditional return from a participation in gross income
rises from 57basis points to only 71 when the closed period is lengthened
from ten years tofifteen and the annual inflation rate is 9 percent.
Vulnerability of Various Kinds of Participation
to Usury Laws
Under conditions of highinflation, some of the return from income
participations may not be realizableby years1 0-15 because its receipt
would violate usury laws in some states.Itis clear that income from
participationsis considered to be interest under the usury laws.Fur-
thermore, the usury test is based on anannual calculation of total interest
received in a particular year divided by the amountof the loan outstanding
during that year. No spreading of the income participation overthe life of
the loanis allowed.It may be advantageous, therefore, to consider
alternative methods of structuring the loan(ground leases or percent-of-
gross participations). Forexample, at an annual inflation rate of 6 percent,
the true return from a mortgage written onthe Houston project at an
interest rate of 8% percent plus a 4 percentparticipation in gross income
will be the same as that from a mortgage written atthe same interest rate
but with a 20 percent participation inthe increase in gross income (see
Table 9). However, at year 10, the accounting returncalculated for usury
purposes will be only 10.3 percentfor the 4-percent-of-gross participation
versus 11.78 percent for a participationin the increase in gross.If state
usury laws impose a ceilingof 11 percent, itis clearly advantageous to
structure the participation as a percentof gross.
TABLE 9Annual Accounting Return on Variable Income
Mortgages as Calculated under UsuryLawsa
Annual 20% of Increase 20% of De-
Rate 2% of Gross in Gross fined Net
of InflationYear 10Year 15Year 10Year 15Year 10Year 15
8Calculated by dividing the total interest received in aparticular year (including theassumed
interest rate of 8'/percent) by the amount of the loanoutstanding during that year. Itis
assumed that rents and operating costs rise at the same
annual rate, beginning in year 1.
0% 9.30% 9.35% 8.88% 8.88% 9.55 9.64%
3 9.42 9.60 10.16 11.32 10.42 11.29
6 9.59 9.95 11.78 14.89 11.51 13.69
9 9.79 10.47 13.81 20.05 12.88 17.17






























Impact of tags on Returns fromVarious
Kinds of Participation
Lags in the responsivenessof rents to inflation havea significant impactor the likely returnson the income participation. The lagscan result from
either delays in renting allthe space, or rent concessionsmade in the first 3-5 years, or leases thatrun for more than one year. Totest the sensitivity
of returns to these lags,it was assumed that rents didnot increase during the first fiveyears but that they then rose inyear 6 by the assumed rate of
inflation compounded forfive years. Rentswere then assumed to stayat that level throughoutyears 6-10 (under new five-yearleases) butwere once again increased inyear 11.
The impact of the lagson the added returns from theincome participa tions is substantial,especially for increase ingross. For example, the added return from a participationof 20 percent of theincrease in gross,assuming a 6 percent annual rate ofinflation, with tenyears remaining before prepayment and no lags inrent increases, is 107 basispoints. The return falls to only 55 basispoints when the five-yearlag in rent increasesis introduced (see rable10).
TABLE 10Increase in EffectiveAnnual Internal Rate ofReturn from an income Participation
(basis points; figuresin parentheses showincrease
assuming five-year lags inrent increases)
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In addition,there are changes in the relative returns from participations
in grosscompared with increase in gross. If there are no lags in rents and
ten yearsrenlaitl before prepayment, increase in gross provides the higher
expected return if inflationis 3 percent per year or more. However, if the
inflation rate is3 percent or less, introduction of five-year lags in rent
increases makesparticipation in total gross more attractive. The return from
each kind Of participationis also influenced strongly by the percent of the
project's total rents that is setcontractually at a fixed level on a long-term
basis. If all rentsand operating costs rise at 6 percent per year, the increase
in the effectiveannual internal rate of return from a participation of three
percent of gross income is73 basis points; for a participation of 20 percent
of the increase in grossincome, it is 107 basis points; for 20 percent of net
income, it is 135 basispoints. If all operating costs but only half the rents
rise at the 6 percent rate,the comparable figures (in basis points) are 65,
50, and 95.
Riskiness of Various Kindsof Income Participation
Participations in gross income aremuch more certain than the two other
types we have beendiscussing. A 5 percent shortfall of grossincome from
its scheduled level reducesthe return from participation in grossby the
same 5 percent.3in contrast, a similar 5 percentshortfall would totally
eliminate the return from a participationstructured asa percent of gross
income in excess of 95 percent ofscheduled rents. A participation indefined
net income obviously is less certainthan percent of gross, but it isless clearly
riskier than participation in gross income over somespecified base level.
Since the breakeven point in termsof defined net is usually lessthan 95
percent of scheduled rents, a 5 percentrent shortfall would noteliminate
the return from a percent-of-net participation.However, uncertainty con-
cerning the level of construction andoperating costs increasesthe risk.
To obtain a better estimate of the comparativeriskiness of different types
of participation, Monte Carlo simulations were run,using the Houston
project data. Distributions, rather than pointestimates, were used asinput
for the following variables: annual inflation rateof revenues, 3-9 percent;
annual inflation rate of costs, 3-9 percent; vacancyrate, 2-8 percent;
initial operating costs, $300,000_$344,000and scheduled gross revenues,
$1,O11,072$1,071,072. For each variableit was assumed thatthe actual
figure would never be less than the low figure orgreater than thehigh one.
The chance that the actual figure would beless than the midpointof the
range was assumed to be 0.5. Prepaymentof the mortgage wasassumed to
occur at the end of the tenth year.
The simulations demonstrated that the returnfrom aperCeflt0Igt055
participation is the most certain and the returnfrom a participationof 20550
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percent of net, the least.For the former, themean increase in the effective annual internalrate o return was 50 basispoints with a standarddeviation of 2 points; thecorresponding figures for thelatter were 134 and14 (for a participation of 20percent of the increase ingross, the figures are 107and 11). In fact, theuncertainty of the additionalreturn from the netincome participation is understatedbecause the risk thatconstruction costsmay be higher than forecasthas been ignored. A10 percent costoverrun, for example, lowers theexpected return fromthat participation from1 34 basis points to only 104. Thedecrease reflectsan increase in interest costsas the result of financing thecost overrun witha ground lease. Inclusion ofa cost offset provisionsimilarly decreases themean return from a participationin gross income overa fixed base level andincreases the standarddeviation.
Income ParticipationsAttached to GroundLeases
As discussed earlier,the impact ofan income participationon the total return from a mortgagetends to increasesubstantially as theduration of the closed period lengthens.Also pointedout were the limitationsplaced on the return byusury laws. In somestates, the permittedreturn during 1968--1970 wasinsufficient to justifymortgage lending activities.A method of financingused tocope with these twoproblems was the purchase ofa land, leaseback,and leaseholdmortgage. Under thatar- rangement, the realestate was split intoa fee (the land) anda leasehold estate (the building).The lenderpurchased the fee andleased the land back to the developer(a ground lease). Thelender then madea mortgage loan on theleasehold estate)3
The term of theground leasewas usually for 25SOyears, tending toward the latter,and sometimesincluded renewaloptions for up to75 years. In recentyears, many lendershave tried to avoidgranting renewal options as they tendto work against thetender. litheproperty attains high economic value, thedevelopercan renew at a predeterminedprice which in all probabilityis less than thetrue value of theproperty. However, ifthe value of theproperty remains belowthe predeterminedprice,, the lease will not be renewed.In recognition ofthis problem,some renewal rentsare based on theappraised value ofthe propertyat the time of renewal.Similar reasoning underliesthe currentreluctance of lendersto include arepur- chase option inthe contract,although allare willing to discussrepurchase at a subsequentdate.
On a



















eturfl from anincome partinpatiOflthat runs for thirty years as part of a
ground leaserather than ten or fifteen years as partof a first mortgage is
5bstanti, especiallyII rents are rising rapidly (Table 1 For example, if
rents increaseat an annual rateof 6 perCent, the total return from a
mogagefinanced by a fixed interest rateof 8/8 percent plus 20 percent of
the increase in grossincome over scheduled rents is 10.62 percent if the
participation runsfor fifteen years and 12.64 percent if the participation
runs for thirtyyears.
An additionaladvantage to the lender of land-leasebacks is the opportu-
nityto avoid thelimitations imposed by usury laws. Some states setceilings
on mortgagesat levels as low as 6 percent.In the 1969-1970 period of
tight money andhigh interest rates, mortgage investment at those levels
could not be made. Evenin states that had a 10 percent maximum usury
rate, a mortgagereturn composed of a fixed rate of91/2 percent pIus 20
percent of the increase in grossincome could exceed the maximum
allowable return within only afew years. This problem could often be
avoided by attaching the incomeparticipation to the ground lease rather
than to the first mortgage.The additional return from the income participa-
tion was thereby considered a partof the ground rent, and the latter was
not subject to usury tests.
LENDER ATTITUDES ON INCOMEPARTICIPATIONS
DURING 1971-1974
Use during 1971-1973
The sharp decline in the incidence of incomeparticipations since 1970
raises questions as to its cause and itsimplications for the future structure
of mortgage financings.In 1969-1970 the majorityof new mortgage
commitments by the large life insurancecompanies included someform of
income participation attached either tothe mortgage or to aground lease.
By early 1973 the proportion had fallen toperhaps 10 percent. Asimilar
pattern is shown in a series developedby the Roy WenzlickResearch
Corporation (The Real Estate Analyst),based on reports from oversixty
major institutional lenders. The peak yearfor the four kinds ofproperty
describedshopping centers,medical and officebuildings,industrial
buildings, and apartmentswas 1970, whenthe share of mortgagesthat
contained participations was, respectively, 29, 42,28, and 79 percent.For
1969, the corresponding figures were 32, 15, 9,and 27 percent,and for
1971, 54, 23, 4, and 30 percent. One yearlater, in 1972, therespective
shares had fallen to 2, 4, 0, and 4 percent. (In 1967. no
participations were
written, except on shopping centers, for whichthe share was 1percent.)



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































result frommajor change in lenderattitudes. Lenders continued in that
period to be veryinterested in income participations, as evidenced by the
following statements:
"If inflation continuesat a 5-7 percent annual rate, we will go into more
deals with incomeparticipations.
'Incomeparticipations have worked out quitewell and we certainly will
get themwherever possible. Real estateand income participations on
mortgages aremuch more certain hedges on inflation than are common
stocks."
The decline islargely explained by changes in the structureand tightness
of the capital markets.The disappointing recovery from the 1970 recession
prompted the monetaryauthorities to accelerate markedly the growth rate
of the money supply (M1)during the first half of 1971. The combinationof
an easier monetarypolicy and a sluggish economyprecipitated a sharp
decline in short-terni interest rates.Yields on three-month Treasury bills fell
from 8 percent in January1970 to less than 4 percent byMarch 1971. This
spurred a massive flow ofdeposits into the thrift institutionsand sig-
nificantly reduced the dollar volumeof new policy loans 01 life insurance
companies. The net acquisitionof financial assets at thesetraditional
mortgage lending institutions morethan doubled in 1971 from the 1969
rate, as shown in Table 6,and the concern of mortgagelenders quickly
shifted to finding enough investmentsfor the unexpectedly highlevel of
investible funds. Income participations were oneof the first features to
disappear as lenders competed forattractive investments byeliminating a
feature that was distasteful todevelopers.
"We didn't write as many participationsinto mortgage loans in1971 as
in the prior two years due to our great eagernessto put investiblefunds
to work in permanent investments."
"Today [19721, we cannot get an incomeparticipation_ever one inthe
lending field has lots of cash."
The emergence and rapid growthof RE1T5 alsoinfluenced the basic
structure of mortgage lending. Itwould take us far afield toanalyze all the
forces that lay behind the formationand subsequentrapid expansion of
many REITs in 1970-1973.Indeed, it is clear thatall REITs were notdriven
by the same forces. It is also clear that there wasa major increasein total
industry assets (from $2 billion at the endof 1969 to $14.2billion at the
end of 1971);16 that the rapid growth wassometimes motivatedby con-
cerns (e.g., management lees andstock options) that wereinconsistent with
sound mortgage lending practice; andthat the loan termsoffered devel-a
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opers by sonic REITs made it difficult for other mortgage lendersto secure
income participations. Specifically, REITs, in theirquest for rapid asset
growth, were willing to provideconstruction loans without requiring that
the developer firstarrange for permanent financing. Approximately halfthe
constrUction loans macIc by REITs during this periodwere believed done
on thatbasis. That action gave developers additionaltime to arrange
permanent financing either, they hoped,at a lower rate or withoutan
income participation, or both.
Use During 1974
Compared to the 1971-1973 period,prevailing conditions in 1974seemed
more conducive to the use of incomeparticipations. Investment perfor-
mance pressures remained strong. Therate of inflation accelerated,and
expectations as to the likely level of futureinflation were revised sharply
upward. The REIT industry,which was wracked by loandelinquencies, lost the confidence of itssuppliers of finance and madevirtually nO new
commitments. In addition, generalconditions in the capital marketstight- ened, witha resultant shiftof bargainingpower toward the lenders.
However, interviews with twelvelife insurancecompanies showed that, on average, only 5 to 10percent of new mortgagecommitments in 1974 included an incomeparticipation. The continued lowuse of income
participations can be attributedto two factors. First, whilegeneral condi- tions in the capital marketswere tight in 1974, many realestate depart- ments of institutionalmortgage lenders experienced farless of a crunch than in 1969-1970In part, this reflected thelimited supply ofacceptable real estate deals.Lender standards ofacceptability and theirperceptions of the riskiness of realestate loans increased during1974. Second, by 1974a number ot mortgage lenderswere reviewing the wisdom of pressing forincome participations. Theadministrative time and cost required to collectthe contingent interesthad been fargreater for some lenders than originallyanticipated, a problem thatprompted one loan officer toremark: "We would tradeall our incomeparticipations negotiated in 1968-1970 for an additionalone-quarter of a percenton the interest rate. Theprojects have workedout reasonably well, hutthe Cost and time spenton trying to collect theparticipations have been fargreater than originally forecast."The majority of therespondents stated that itwas often difficult toobtain the requiredfinancial statementsfrom the bor- rower. A typicalstatement made bya life insurancecompany officer indicated that theborrower wouldgenerally do, oragree to, practically anything thatwas asked of himup until the time hegot the money, but that
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new-money rate of lenders, force both sidesto incur additional administra
tive costs, increase the debt burdenoil the de'etupei, dud may limit the
maximum size of the first-mortgage loan(see the section on "Typesof
Participation Agreement," above). Thedamage done to the developermust be offset by an interestrate concession in excess of that Warrantedby the
greater uncertainty ofparticipations relative to additional fixedinterest. However, most lenderswere unwilling to make the additionalconcessions on rate in 1974, as they recognized theadverse impact of participationson their own administrativecosts and the net new-money rate. Also,their forecasts of the likelyvalue of participationswere tempered by their
experience with participationsnegotiated in 1969-17o, thepoor health of the real estate industry,and the major shift inorientation of theirown investment strategies.
The possibility ofnegotiating a participation in theincrease in gross over a base level, with an offset forincreases in cash operatingcosts, seems better. As discussed earlier,a participation of this form reducesthe annual debt burden andmay increase the size of themaximum allowable first- mortgage loan. Its disadvantagesare its impact on the netnew-money rate and the additionaladministrative costs it entails.Apparently, the advan- tages were more than offsetby a combination ofthese disadvantages plus the high riskaversion of lenderscompared to developers, andlenders' conservative forecasts of thevalue of participationsParticipations struc- tured in this formare highly uncertain andmay not have been valuedas highly by the lendersas by the borrowers. Thisis in marked contrastto 1968-1970 when theenthusiasm of lenders forparticipations and their ability to negotiatehistorically attractiveinterest rateseven aftera con- cession in return for theparticipation_resulted in very littlecareful analy- sis of theparticipation'5 value.
SUMMARY
Real estate financingtechniques forincome-producingproperties un- derwent substantialchange during1 966-1970. Many largeinstitutional investors movedaway from their traditionalrole as first-mortgagelenders on a fixed interest rate basisto insistence onParticipating in the incomeof the property beingfinanced.
Life insurancecompanies were by far themost active and, becauseof their size, themost important of themajor types of financialinstitution using incomeparticipations While only3 percent of theirnew commit- ments on incomeproducing
properties in 1964 includedincome or equity participations, theproportion reached 62percent in the first half of1969and anestimated 7075 percent during the first half ot 1970. The inci-
dence of incomeand equity participatuns Ofi illortgageoiiiini(meiits by
life msurancecompanies then subsided as quickly as it had arisen, ac-
0unting for an estimated 5--lO percentof new commitments in 1973 and
1974.
The increased use of incomeparticipations resulted from a convergence
of institutional interestin equities of all types, institutional concern over
rising inflation, strongreal estate markets, and the belief that real estate
rents would beresponsive to inflation. Simulations seemed to substantiate
the potential of incomeparticipations, especially if the rate of inflation was
high.
Several additional factors contributed toinstitutional interest in participa-
tions. First, the lenders werereceiving very high interest ratesat least on
an historicalbasiseven after some small concession to get the participa-
tion. Second, somelenders felt compelled to follow competitors into
extensive use of income participations outof fear that they would oth-
erwise suffer severe competitivedisadvantage should participations prove
valuable. Third, income participationsrepresented an opportunity for lend-
ers to expand theirequity investments in real estate withoutviolating
stringent statutory restrictions onthe maximum percent of assets that could
be invested in real estate.
Borrowers resisted income participations. inpart because the forms of
participation that were most appealing tolenders often caused significant
problems to developers. Their resistancebecame less effective during
1969-1970 asconditionsinthe capital markets tightened.Inflation,
throughits impact on the general levelof interestrates, resultedin
disintermediation in the traditional mortgagelending institutions. Life in-
surance companiesexperienced a substantial increase in policyloans, and
the growth of savings bank deposits wasslower than forecast. The combi-
nation of strong competing corporatedemand for funds, heavy forward
commitment positions, and a supply ofinvestibte funds below the amount
forecast required lenders to reduce new mortgagecommitments. At the
same time, real estate financingneeds were strong, and REITshad not yet
begun making permanent mortgage loans. As aresult, there was a strong
shift in bargaining power toward the lender,and that increased bargaining
power was used, in part, to secureincome participations.
It is not clear, however, that lenders'bargaining power wasbest used to
secure a participation. Participationscreated a number ofproblems for
parties on each side of the transaction_problemsthat were not benefits to
the other side. Participations were notperfect substitutes (evenafter risk
adjustment) for fixed interest rates, and theirpopularity during 1968-i970
seems related to lender enthusiasmfor equities, lenderbelief that real
estate ownership was very profitableand that many developershad be-
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come rich while lenders took the risk, and lender ability tosecure
historically high interest rates, even alter some concession(usually one-
eighth to one-half percent) for the participation. Very few lendersanalyzed
participations carefully; they felt strongly that participationswere attractive
and sought them aggressively, often without careful analysis oftheir worth
or of alternative methods of structuring the loan.
By 1974, conditions had changed significantly, and withthe change
came a sharp decrease in the use of participations. The bargainingPower
of lenders was less than in 1969-1970. Perhapsmore important, lenders
were less enthusiastic about participations and less willing, forseveral
reasons, to make the necessary interest rate concessions tosecure them.
First, the administrative time and cost requiredto collect the contingent
interest had been far greater forsome lenders than originally anticipated.
Second, aggressive equity investing had falleninto disfavor in a number of
institutions. Third, while participations eitherin gross income or in the
increase n gross over a fixed base levelhad worked out reasonably well,
the time period necessary for themto generate significant additionalreturn
had been longer than anticipated.Finally, doubts developedamong some
lenders as to the relationship betweenthe rate of inflation and realestate
economics. The strong belief of the 1969-1970period that returns from
real estate would benefit from inflationwas challenged by the experience
of 1971-1974, at least forprojects caught by inflation during theircon-
struction phase.
NOT[S
The discussion of the various types ofparticipation agreements is based inpart on
Mundy (1971). The charactei uzat ion of lenderand borrower attitudes is basedon the results of my field work.
As shown in Table 5, 40 percent of allnonfarm mortgage and real estatecommitments made by life insurance companieson income properties during the calendaryear 1968 and the first half of 1969 includedsome form of income or equity participation. It
follows, therefore, that 24percent (0.61x 0.40) of all commitmentson income
properties during that period includeda contingent interest participation
The presence of an incomeparticipation has no impact on theappraised value of the property under standard appraisalpractices. However internal appraisalpractices of some institutions madiffer from that standard.
The capitalization ratenecessary to repay a thirty-yearmortgage at 952 percent is
0.101681. This is somewhat ofan oversimplification of the factors thatare considered in
setting a capitalization rate, but it isadequate for this analysis becausethe purpose here isto show the dif!erences that resultfrom alternajivimethods of structuring the financing.
The uindirigs reported here aridelsewhere in this articleare based on field intervie with twelve lie insurancecompanies, three mortgage banking firms, fourmutual savings banks, and seven developers.The difference between the numberof actual respondentt














and the numberof firms interviewed reflects a lackof adequate interviewing time. The
interviews with theother institutions hsted at the begionrog of thisartrcle, while not
directed specificallY atthe issues covered here, did not yield anycontradictory evi-
dence.
.Loan 'lKickers1'Walt Street Journal, July15, 1969, p.t.
7In addition,real estate investment truststhat structure participations as a percent ot net
forfeit their special taxstatus.
The figures for1973 and 1974 are based on ourfield interviews with twelve life
insurance companiesand three mortgage bankers.
Some inshjtUti0flSma(le little use of participations for statutory reasons.For example,
federally chartered savingsand loan associations were prohibited bylaw from engaging
In income participations.
0The lag between thedate of commitment arid the dateof takeclown on mortgage loans
to0çomeproduc1g properties isroughly twenty-four months, the exact lengthdepend-
ing on the typeof property (see Lintner, Piper,Fortune 1975).I estimate that the $10
billion of outstandingcommitments on nonfarm,incomeproduciuig properties as of
Septe'rber 30, 1970 weremade largely from mid-1968 toSeptember 30, 1970, a period
when life insurancecompanies were negotiating incomeparticipations on anywhere
from 28 percent1968) to 70-75 percent(first half of 1970) of such loans.
11.The aggregate balancesheet value of REIT mortgagesfor the final quarter of each year
1968-1971 arid for lone 1972(in millions of dollars) was asfollows Schulkin, 1972, p.
9):
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The majority oflongterniniOrtgage REITs wereorganized during 1970 andtherefore
had no impact on theavailability and terms of mortgagefinance (luring muchof the
period investigated here.UnfortunatelY, it is not possible totranslate year-end holdings
of mortgages by REITs intoforward commitirients duringeach period since asignificant
percent of the holdingsresulted from the purchase ofexisting mortgages. SeeHitchcock
(1973).
12.Premiuiii and annuity laclors asshares of disposablepersonal income rangedbetween
3.6 percent and 40 percentbetween 1950 and 1972,and were 3.6 percent in1974
IU.S. Department of Commerceand Spectator YearBook (New York: Instituteof Life
Insurance)l.
13Figures are based on Moody'scomposite stock indexand include bothdividend income
and capital gains during theperiod 1946-1965. Seealso Fisher and (.orie(1968).
Ufe insurance companies areseverely restricted intheir use of commonstock for
investing irs general account reserves.
Since that time total assetsheld by U.S. life insurance
companies in separateacc0Unt5
has reached $10 billion, with over80 percentinvested in commonstocks as ot year-end
1973.
According to Lintner (1973), similararguments weremade in the mid-19505for equity
investments.
The respective turnover rates ofstockholdings in generaland in separateaccounts ot a
sample of life insurance companies rose
from 7.5 and 2.5percent during 1965 to16.1
1968 IV 19&91V 19701V 1971 IV June 1972
Long-teim conventional
first mortgages $26 $26 $97 $ 569 $1,041











and 30.5 percent during 1969 (see Institutional Investor Study Report 1971, vol.2, p.
758).
Extensive field interviews by Piper and Arnold (1976) confirnied the strengthof these
pressures.
Ricks found that four of the fourteenlife insurance companies interviewedwere
reducing their investment real estate holdings as of 1964; eightwere acquinng invest.
men) real estate but with terms more similar to those of a loan; onlytwo were
aggressively acquiring real estate with strong equity positions. InterestinglyRicks found
that out of ten university endowment funds whosemanagers were actively seeking real
estate investment four expressed substantial interest in the impact of inflationon the
residual value.
Other studies indicating the attractiveness ofreturns on equity investment in real estate
include Hayes and Harlan (1967) and Wendt and Wong(1965). It should be observed
that the tax shelter was a major component of therate of return on real estate investment
as computed by Wend) and Wong.
Institute of Real Estate Management, Apartment BuildingExperience Exchange of Rental
Income and Operating Expense Data, annual issues; andBuilding Owners and Managers
Association International, Office Building ExperienceExchange Report, annual issues.
For a historical perspective on Investor attitudeson the relationship of inflation and stock
prices, see Lintner (1973).
The additional return was calculated by dividingthe income from the participation ina
particular year by the amount of principal outstanding(luring that year. For information
on rent increases during the l960, see thesources cited in footnote 21.
The interview evidence clearly showsthat income participations were usuallyrequired by the lenders. All twenty-four lendinginstitutions, developers, and mortgage bankers
that responded to the question stated thatincome participations were resisted bymost
developers and sought after by the lenders.
Shipp collected and compared monthlydata on rates and terms on incomeproperty
mortgage loans authorized by fifteen large lifeinsurance companies. The increase in
loan-to-'al,e ratios and loan maturitiescontinued until 1968, when they tendedto stabilize (see Fisher and Opper1973).
Graham11969, pp. 29-30j reports that "some lendersshowed a willingness to make
Construction loans where no firm long-termmortgage commitments existed. Thiswas done only in those cases wherethe sponsors had superior fimiancialstrength, had demonstrated their ability to markettheir product, and where theproperty enjoyed a prime location."
All respondents cited the speechdelivered in October 1969 byMcChesney Martin, Chairman of the Federal ReserveBoard, as a key turning point, afterwhich (and until mid-1970) even strong developerswere forced typically to give an incomeParticipation. Typically, the expected valuewas based on annual rent increases of3 to 4 percent. Mundy reported thatlenders triedto strdcture income participationstoyield an additional 70 to 100 basispoints (100 basis points= I percentage point) on an annual
accounting basis by the third to fifthyear. (The annual accounting basis relatesthe income from the participation ina specific year to the aniount of principaloutstanding inthat year.)
The conclusions drawn fromthe Houston simulationswere found to he consistent with those based on a set of simulationsrun on a shopping center in Coloradoto test the applicability of the earlier results.
This assumption clearly isnot reasonable for incomeproperties under long-term lease arrangements, although such contractuallags are easilyacconimodated in the calcula- tions. A more seriousconcern are the economic andpolitical relationships among
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inflation, conStr11ct10'
COStS, o,erating costs, and rents. As discussed in a later section
substantial additionalresearCh is needed n'this area.
A percentofgt055participation i, of course, oflittle value1 the shortfall of gross
income threatensthe health of the project and results either indefault or renegotiation of
the terms of thedeal.
During 1969-1970,
most life insurance lenders provided the first-mortgagefinancing for
the leasehold estate aswell as the ground lease. Lenders stated that the termsof the first
mortgages onleaseholds alone did not differ significantlyfrom those on which the
lenders provided astandard first mortgage on the entire property exceptthat the interest
rate of the former wastypically one-quarter to one-half percent higher. It wasalso felt
that the quality of theproject and developer did not differ significantly inthe two kinds
of loan.
The developer can securefinancing equal to roughly 85-90 percent of theappraised
value if the ground leaseis subordinated to the leasehold mortgage. Insurance com-
panies also are allowed twoother means of accomplishing the same end. Thefirst is a
'basket clause" loan, inwhich an insurance company can invest up to4 percent of its
general account adniitted assetsin investnients that do not otherwisequalify (in a
statutory sense) for investment.The second is ahigh credit lease," through which the
law allows more than75-80 percent financing ifthe propertyis to be occupied
principally by a tenant whosecredit standing is of the highest quality.
35The property will usually berefinanced alter ten to fiIteen years, since theoutstanding
mortgage is then low inrelationship to the then value of the property.
For a discussion of theeffect of real estate investment trusts onthe supply of mortgage
funds, see Korobow and Gelson(1971, pp. 188-195)
This conclusion was substantiatedin a private study by HaroldMcKenna, senior vice
president of Cabot, Cabot & ForbesLand Trust. On the basis of interviewswith fifteen
life insurance companies inearly1974, McKcnna determinedthat twelve of the
companies had had good experiencewith their income participations onmortgage
loans. The live savings banksinterviewed had been considerablyless succes'ful,
although the low payoff from theirparlicipations seemed to reflect aweak collection
effort.
36. A number of RUT constructionloans were made without aprior arrangement for
permanent financing or were made on astandby basis at rates that the protectcould not
support.
39.The adverse impact of inflation onnet-income participations wasaggravated by vacancy
rates that were frequentlyhigher than originally forecast.In part, the overbuildingin
1969-1972 reflected the combinedeffects of imperfect informationabout the building
plans of other developers, cyclicalvariations in the demand for newspace, and the
acceleration of some building plans tolessen the impact ofcontinued cost incieases.
However, there is also some evidencethat the extent ofoverbuilding was aggravatedby
a breakdown of the rewardand control systems thatiriIluenced the actions of some
developers and lenders, Their actions, in turn,
produced projects that were noteconom-
ically viable and that at the same time
undermined entire real estatemarkets. Some
developers, unencumbered by personnet orparent company guaranteesand eager to
keep their development teamstogether, proceeded with protectsthat had, at best,
marginal prospects. The opportunity to take a
development fee equal to4 to 5 percent of
the project's cost, irrespective of the
project's performance oncecompleted. was
attractive.
The ability of those developers toproceed with economically
unsound prOlects was
facilitated by the actions of somelenders who werealso roOtivatOd byshort-run
considerations or who did notunderstand the economicsof the proJeCts. Manyreal
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estate investriient trusts, tOr example, apparently scranibted for growth when they should
have been more careful alx)ut their loans.Iheir basis br compensation, which was
typically related to total assets managed, further encouraged some of themto finance
weak projects. The impact of these decisions was transmitted throughout the realestate
markets; it was reflected in rents and vacancy rates, arid adversely affected projectsand
income participations of all types.
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